The road ahead after de Larosière. CEPS Policy Brief No. 195, 7 August 2009 by Lannoo, Karel.
 
CEPS Policy Briefs present concise, policy-oriented analyses of topical issues in European affairs, with the aim of interjecting 
the views of CEPS researchers and associates into the policy-making process in a timely fashion. Unless otherwise indicated, 
the views expressed are attributable only to the author in a personal capacity and not to any institution with which he is 
associated. 
Karel Lannoo is Chief Executive at CEPS.  
Available for free downloading from the CEPS website (http://www.ceps.eu) y © CEPS 2009 
The road ahead after de Larosière 
Karel Lannoo 
 
he decisions taken by the European Finance 
Ministers on 9 June 2009, and subsequently 
adopted by the European Council on the 18-19 
June, broadly implement the proposals on European 
financial supervision put forward by the de Larosière 
Committee and the European Commission, and also 
provide the necessary detail. From 2010 onwards, a 
new structure should be in place to ensure more 
integrated European macro- and micro-prudential 
oversight. The macroeconomic body – the European 
Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) – will be consultative in 
nature and will largely function within the context of 
the ESCB (European System of Central Banks). 
Hence its implementation should not be too 
problematic. The different functional authorities 
coordinating micro-prudential supervision will be 
established by the Council in the autumn, basically 
upgrading the existing Committees, but they will have 
a substantially increased workload, which raises 
important structural and organisational issues.  
Apart from the adaptation of the institutional 
structure, the EU is currently implementing a 
comprehensive regulatory response to the crisis, 
following at the same time a globally dictated agenda 
pursued by the G-20 and a set of ‘single market’ 
measures. The latter result from inconsistencies (e.g. 
deposit guarantee schemes) and gaps (e.g. mortgage 
credit) in the existing regulatory framework. 
This ambitious workload coincides with important 
changes afoot on the EU scene, which could delay the 
legislative process. A new European Parliament is 
coming into office, and will take some time to get a 
grip on the different dossiers. With more than 50% of 
the elected MEPs serving for the first time and more 
than 100 important positions to be decided upon in the 
new EP, a fast track of new legislation cannot be 
expected. In addition, a new college of European 
Commissioners will be appointed after the summer, 
and a new work programme adopted. Moreover, the 
possible implementation of the Lisbon Treaty by the 
end of the year could result in further seismic shifts. 
In short, the circumstances in the European Union are 
not especially favourable at the present time for 
achieving an enormous legislative agenda. 
The de Larosière agenda 
The Council of Finance (Ecofin) Ministers of 9 June 
2009 agreed upon a new structure for supervision in 
the EU, consisting of essentially four new entities: a 
European Systemic Risk Board and a European 
System of Financial Supervisors (ESFS), comprising 
three functional authorities (see figure below). The 
Council conclusions describe in much detail the 
framework and responsibilities of the new supervisory 
bodies. Implementation of either of these decisions, 
however, still raises problems: of a conceptual nature 
for the ESRB, and of a more organisational character 
for the ESFS.  
The Ecofin Council stated in its conclusions that 
“regulation and supervision in Member States and in 
the EU must be enhanced in an ambitious way 
ensuring trust, efficiency, accountability and 
consistency with the allocation of responsibilities for 
financial stability, taking into account the 
responsibility of Finance Ministers.”
1 Ministers 
probably wanted to recall earlier discussions in the 
Ecofin on financial supervision in 2002, and remind 
the public that, because of the accountability to 
taxpayers, they are in control.
2 The respect of fiscal 
sovereignty is further reiterated several times in the 
Council conclusions. 
                                                      
1 Council conclusions on Strengthening EU financial 
supervision, Luxembourg, 9 June 2009. 
2 See conclusions of the Ecofin Council of May 2002. 
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The European Systemic Risk Board 
(and the ECB) at the centre 
The ESRB will be at the centre of the new system, 
even if this body is only consultative. Its nine-member 
Steering Committee is composed of the four ESCB 
members (including the President of the ECB), the 
three chairs of the European Supervisory Authorities 
(ESAs), a member of the EU Commission and the 
President of the Economic and Financial Committee 
(EFC). The dominance of the central bankers in the 
governance of the new structure is even clearer in the 
General Board of the ESRB, which comprises, apart 
from the Steering Committee members, all central 
bank governors of the EU 27. The creation of the 
Steering Committee, not foreseen in the de Larosière 
report, probably responds to the criticism that the 
ESRB would be too unwieldy to be effective. 
The ESRB will have its seat in the ECB and will rely 
on the analytical and administrative services and skills 
of this well-reputed and established institution. Thus it 
will also be controlled by the ECB. The Finance 
Ministers have only one representative in the ESRB. 
Hence, notwithstanding the declaration of the Finance 
Ministers that they want to be in the driver’s seat, the 
power will reside with the central bankers. 
The ECB had reacted against the establishment of the 
ESRB as a separate legal entity, which the European 
Commission initially proposed, and preferred the use 
of Art. 105.6 of the EU Treaty to confer macro-
prudential tasks to the ECB/ESCB. However, as the 
latter requires unanimity in the EU Council – and 
therefore seemed very improbable – the ECB 
preferred the former option, but functioning as a 
consultative body only. In a confidential note on the 
Commission’s working document on European 
financial supervision,
3 it wrote: “The establishment of 
the ESRB as an EU body with legal personality would 
create a separate EU quasi-central banking institution 
with responsibilities that are overlapping with the 
financial stability tasks performed by the 
ECB/ESCB”. It noted that a separate entity would 
become confusing and raise questions of 
representation and competence.  
The ESRB should: 
-  define, identify and prioritise all macro-financial 
risks; 
-  issue risk warnings and give recommendations to 
policy-makers, supervisors and eventually to the 
public; 
-  monitor the follow-up of the risk warnings, and 
warn the EU Council in the event that the follow-
up is found to be inappropriate; 
-  liaise with international and third country 
counterparts; and 
-  report at least bi-annually to the EU Council and 
European Parliament. 
The ESRB will strengthen the ECB’s role also in 
another sense. Through the ESRB, the ECB will have 
access to micro-prudential information. Throughout 
the financial crisis, ECB officials have criticised the 
lack of access to supervisory information of financial 
institutions. In its confidential memo to the 
Commission President, the ECB requested the right to 
collect supervisory information: “The ECB/ESCB 
                                                      
3 ECB, The establishment of the European Systemic Risk 
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should be provided with the task to collect and share 
macro-prudential and aggregated micro-prudential 
information (…) which is necessary for the 
performance of the tasks of the ESRB”.
4 The Ecofin 
Council decided differently, however, stating that the 
“central European database should be established and 
managed by the European Supervisory Authorities.” 
But this information should be shared with the ESRB 
“subject to specific confidentiality agreements”, it was 
added. 
Crisis management is not mentioned as a task of the 
ESRB, but of the ESFS in an exploratory way. This is 
a departure from the ad-hoc agreement reached in the 
European Council in October 2008, whereby the 
President of the ECB (in conjunction with the other 
European central banks) formed part of a financial 
crisis cell, with the President of the Commission, the 
EU Council and the Eurogroup. 
The task is now essentially for the ECB to bring the 
ESRB into existence. Although the ESRB can depend 
on formidable back-office support from the ECB, it 
will face significant conceptual challenges. Will it be 
capable, for example, of clearly identifying and 
reacting to a bubble amongst the hundreds of possible 
risks on the horizon? Will it have sufficient authority 
and the necessary imagination to challenge 
conventional wisdom? Will the reporting tree function 
and the reaction be adequate? Will the boundary with 
the micro-financial tasks be drawn in an unambiguous 
way?
5 The ECB needs to realise that the responsibility 
it takes in assuming this task could negatively impact 
its reputation in the future, and eventually its 
independence in setting monetary policy.
6 Hence the 
ESRB should have sufficient independence from the 
ECB. Any further discussion on this subject, which is 
also taking place in the US with the proposed creation 
of a Financial Services Oversight Council, should 
proceed with extreme caution.
7 However, it seems 
                                                      
4 Ibid., p. 4. 
5 See Persaud (2009) on the difficulties of macro-prudential 
regulation. 
6 It should be recalled that the ECB already has a committee 
under its roof with responsibility for some of the functions 
expected of the ESRB. Its Banking Supervisory Committee 
(BSC) brings together banking supervisors of all the EU 
countries, and not only the eurozone, to discuss macro-
prudential and financial stability issues. In response to 
criticism on the lack of macro-prudential oversight in the 
EU, the ECB explicitly indicated in 2001 that its Banking 
Supervision Committee would perform that role (see EFC, 
2001, p. 7). It is expected that as a result of the crisis 
financial stability will become a more pronounced objective 
of the ECB (see De Grauwe & Gros, 2009). 
7 On the US, see Emil Henry, “Daunting decisions on a new 
risk regulator”, Financial Times, 11 June 2009. See also US 
Treasury (2009) and Pollock (2009) on the US and Bini-
Smaghi (2009) on the EU. 
that, because of these conceptual challenges and 
institutional issues, the European solution of creating 
a purely consultative body, separate from the central 
bank, finance ministers or supervisors, is the right step 
forward. It respects their respective roles on how to 
act upon the recommendations of the ESRB. 
The European System of Financial 
Supervisors 
The establishment of the ESFS is a daunting task. 
Unlike the ESRB, the authorities can hardly rely on an 
existing structure, but almost need to start from 
scratch, or need to magnify the tasks currently 
performed by the Committees to an exponential 
degree. It is for this reason (among others) that we 
recommended establishing these authorities under a 
single roof from the very beginning, in order to share 
as much as possible a common administration and 
avoid unnecessary duplication of effort and confusion 
of responsibilities. However, a single roof would have 
meant a single location, the selection of which would 
have opened a Pandora’s box that the EU Council 
preferred to keep closed. Problems would inevitably 
have arisen from the fact that the Committees forming 
the basis of the three future authorities have their seats 
in the (business) capitals of the three most important 
member states of the EU, respectively Paris, London 
and Frankfurt.  
The ESFS will be responsible for: 
-  moving towards the realisation of a single 
rulebook, 
-  ensuring harmonised supervisory practices, 
-  strengthening the oversight of cross-border groups 
and supervise pan-European entities, 
-  establishing a central European database 
aggregating all micro-prudential information and 
-  ensuring a coordinated response in crisis situations. 
The three authorities can be expected to be established 
as regulatory agencies under EU law, following Art. 
95 of the EU Treaty. Although the Council stated that 
the choice of the legal basis has not yet been taken, 
the Commission proposed in its Communication Art. 
95 of the EU Treaty, relating to the adoption of 
measures for the approximation of legislation for the 
functioning of the internal market. Since the agencies 
will work on the development of a single rule book to 
ensure uniform application of rules in the EU, they 
will contribute to the functioning of the internal 
market. 
The use of Art. 95 has another advantage, in that the 
decision to establish the authorities could be taken by 
qualified majority vote (QMV) in the EU Council. 
This compares to Art. 308, which requires unanimity. 
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delegate large powers to the agencies, QMV would 
allow the European Commission to go for a broader 
mandate.
8 On the other hand, Art. 95 requires co-
decision with the European Parliament, which is not 
the case for Art. 308, implying that the decision 
process under Art. 95 may take longer. In any case, 
for such important decisions, it is advisable to have 
them taken by as unanimous approval as possible.  
Much now depends on the precise elaboration of the 
mandate of the agencies in the Commission’s 
proposals, which the Ecofin Council expects in the 
early autumn 2009 “at the latest”. Among the 28 EU 
regulatory agencies existing at present, no general 
rules apply governing their creation and operation. 
They were set up on a ad hoc basis rather than via a 
coherent administrative and/or regulatory method. 
Consequently, large differences exist between them 
when it comes to their functions, organisational 
structure and funding provisions.
9 Given the 
supervisory problems raised by the crisis, a precise 
proposal on the mandate, tasks, organisation, 
decision-making procedures, funding and 
accountability of the new agencies is crucial. 
In comparison to the tasks assigned to the ‘Level 3’ 
Committees (3L3), as created by the 2001 Lamfalussy 
report, the workload has been magnified significantly. 
Whereas the 3L3 had an essentially advisory task on 
regulatory matters – advising the European 
Commission on implementing rules – the new 
authorities will in addition have many supervisory 
duties. The realisation of a single rulebook and the 
consistent application of EU rules continue and extend 
regulatory tasks of the Committees. In this regard, the 
Council conclusions mention that a mechanism should 
be developed to ensure more consistent application of 
EU law and a tougher sanctioning regime for cases of 
non-respect. But the addition of supervisory 
responsibilities and the constitution of a central 
supervisory database will impose a new and heavy 
workload. The Council conclusions mention, inter 
alia: 
-  coordinating the supervisory analyses of financial 
groups, 
-  ensuring consistency in supervisory outcomes 
across financial groups, 
                                                      
8 The basis could be challenged by the member states. In 
2004, the UK challenged the choice of Art. 95 EC as the 
legal basis of the European Network and Information 
Security Agency (ENISA) before the European Court of 
Justice and stated that Art. 308 EC was the only possible 
legal basis. The Court ruled that the use of Art. 95 EC was 
appropriate for ENISA, as it constituted a part of the 
normative context directed at completing the internal 
market in the area of electronic communications. See 
Andoura & Timmerman (2008), p. 7. 
9 Ibid., p. 9. 
-  participating and eventually mediating in 
supervisory colleges, 
-  supervision of pan-European entities and 
-  developing common training for supervisors. 
To imagine what this means in terms of increased 
workload, one can recall that on the banking side 
alone, there are 123 different supervisory colleges 
(Lannoo, 2008, p. 32). If the new European Banking 
Authority (EBA) needs to participate in all these 
meetings, and coordinate the supervisory analyses, 
this will require a multiplication of the staff of the 
current Committee of European Banking Supervisors 
(CEBS). For comparison, the average number of staff 
members of the European regulatory agencies is 157 
persons (Andoura & Timmerman, 2008, p. 11). 
The extensive supervisory tasks may cause problems 
with the member states and raise the question of the 
powers of the agency. According to Court 
jurisprudence, the authorities can not exercise more 
powers than the delegating authority possesses under 
the EU Treaty.
10 Some of the responsibilities listed 
above could be on the borderline between tasks falling 
to the EU under the Treaty, and those remaining a 
member state competence. In addition, the question 
can be raised who is in charge of enforcement. Under 
the 2001 Lamfalussy report, the hardly mentioned 
‘Level 4’, i.e. enforcement, was a Commission 
competence, whereas under the new proposals on the 
table, the ESAs would share enforcement 
competences with the EU Commission. 
The coming into force of the Lisbon Treaty should 
facilitate the implementation of this new framework, 
particularly with the single rulebook and the 
harmonised supervisory practices. If adopted, the 
Lisbon Treaty would clarify the hierarchy of norms in 
the EU’s regulatory framework and distinguishes 
between legislative acts, delegated acts and 
implementing acts. It would replace the current 
‘comitology’ framework, which, for financial markets, 
was the centrepiece of the Lamfalussy report. A 
delegated act assigns to the Commission the power to 
adopt non-legislative acts of general application to 
supplement or amend certain non-essential elements 
of the legislative act. An implementing act will be 
adopted “where uniform conditions for implementing 
legally binding Union acts are needed”, which confers 
implementing powers on the Commission. This 
should allow the current level 3 of Lamfalussy to 
become binding. 
                                                      
10 See the landmark Meroni case (9/56, 1957-1958), as 
quoted in Andoura & Timmerman (2008, p. 12) in which 
the European Court of Justice clarified the conditions under 
which a delegation of powers could be granted to a new 
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The degree of independence to be accorded the ESAs 
remains ambiguous. The Council conclusions reiterate 
that the ESAs should be independent vis-à-vis both 
the national authorities and the European institutions. 
But they will assist the Commission in the consistent 
interpretation and application of Community law. And 
the decisions they take should not impinge on fiscal 
responsibilities of the member states, which severely 
restricts their powers. A problem in this regard is the 
supervision of pan-European entities. Recent EU 
decisions have already anticipated the creation of the 
ESAs. For example, the new regulation on credit 
rating agencies (CRAs) gives the Committee of 
European Securities Regulators (CESR) certain 
competences in the supervision of these bodies. CESR 
should facilitate the registration of CRAs in the EU 
and can mediate in the supervisory college.
11 Other 
possible areas for pan-European supervision are 
central counterparties and securities settlement 
systems. The Ecofin Council conclusions note that 
some member states do not agree with this approach, 
since it could affect national fiscal responsibilities 
(Council conclusions, p. 5). The same reasoning 
applies for crisis management, where it seems that the 
ESAs will exercise limited responsibility for 
emergency regulatory decisions, such as short-selling 
restrictions. However, mediating in supervisory 
colleges has fiscal implications, nolens volens. 
The Council conclusions are less detailed on the 
governance of the ESAs than on the ESRB. They only 
call for a Steering Committee of the ESAs to reinforce 
mutual understanding and coordinate information-
sharing. This reinforces our view that the ESRB will 
be at the centre of the new supervisory architecture, as 
they will have the vue d’ensemble.  
The weakness of the European solution for micro-
prudential supervision is that, out of realpolitik 
considerations, the EU chose to maintain the 
functional model of supervision at EU level. 
Supervision by objective would have been better 
adapted, leading, following the principle of 
subsidiarity, to a more rational and efficient allocation 
of responsibilities at European level. The current 
structure will give rise to duplication of tasks and 
confusion in the allocation of responsibilities. A more 
integrated structure, for example, to supervise pan-
European entities or constitute a European supervisory 
database would be much more effective. On the other 
hand, compared to the proposed supervisory reform in 
the US, where the only structural change on the 
micro-prudential side is the merger of the Office of 
Thrift Supervision (OTS) and the Office of the 
Controller of the Currency (OCC, the European 
                                                      
11 Regulation (EC) of 14 July 2009 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on credit rating agencies, 
awaiting publication in the Official Journal. 
structure may over time become more integrated, 
provided the mandate of the new authorities is 
sufficiently comprehensive, and the EU member states 
contribute constructively to the new structure.  
The post-crisis regulatory agenda 
The new European Parliament will have to face the 
dual challenge of dealing with the legislation on the 
adaptation of the institutional structure on top of the 
post-crisis regulatory agenda. The latter is driven by 
international (G-20) as well as European single 
market considerations. Some parts of this agenda have 
already been completed, but others have just been 
initiated or are still in the pipeline.  
The crisis revealed important shortcomings in the 
regulatory framework, to the extent that a core 
principle of the single market, the single passport and 
home country control, was called into question. To 
restore this principle, the European Commission will 
have to engage in moving towards a much higher 
degree of harmonisation in certain areas. Following 
the EU’s 1993 deposit protection directive, three 
different schemes of protection co-exist: the 
protection offered the home country (applicable to the 
head offices and its branches or through free provision 
of services), the protection offered the host country (in 
case the bank is a subsidiary of a foreign bank) and 
the home country scheme ‘topped up’ with the level 
offered by the host country (in case the level of 
protection for a branch operating in the host country is 
lower than that of its home country). Until the crisis 
broke out, an overwhelming majority of consumers 
was not aware of the consequential differences in 
protection schemes. In the midst of the crisis, the 
member states provisionally agreed in the EU Council 
to increase the minimum levels to €50,000, but did not 
change schemes of the basics of the 1993 EU 
directive,  nor the method of funding or the statute. 
The European Commission will need to report before 
the end of 2009 on how to reform the system for the 
long term. 
Other elements will need to be reformed to get 
consumers back on board of the single market. 
Mortgage lending, for example, is not subject to any 
degree of EU harmonisation, whereas (short-term) 
consumer lending is. Although mortgage lending is 
about 9 times more important than other forms of 
consumer credit, a consultation in 2007 concluded that 
the different forms of national legislation seemed to 
work well enough, and that there was no immediate 
need for European harmonisation (European 
Commission, 2007).  However, principles such as 
responsible lending and loan-to-value ratios could 
well be harmonised and enforced at European level, as 
lax standards in one member state has European-wide 
implications. 6 | Karel Lannoo 
Status of post-crisis financial services legislation  
Measure Purpose  Status 
Depositor protection schemes  Increase minimum level of protection 
to €50,000 
Adopted October 2008, report by end-
2009 
Credit rating agencies  Introduce single licence  Adopted April 2009 
Amendments to capital requirements 
Directive (CRD) 
-  securitisation 
-  executive remuneration 
-  trading book and complex 
financial products 
 
 
- min. 5 % on a bank’s books 
- extra charge for high pay packages 
- higher capital for trading book 
 
 
Directive (adopted April 2009) 
Draft directive (July 2009) 
 
Draft directive (July 2009) 
Hedge funds  Regulate non-regulated segment of 
fund industry 
Draft directive (April 2009) 
Prospectus Directive  Possible review  Consultation (January 2009) 
Investor compensation schemes  Possible review  Consultation (February 2009) 
UCITS IV  Implementing measures  Consultation of CESR (March 2009) 
Market abuse  Improve and simplify directive  Consultation (April 2009) 
Depositaries of funds  Segregate funds from depositaries  Consultation (May 2009) 
OTC markets  Transparency, mandate some central 
clearing 
Consultation (June 2009) 
European Systemic Risk Board  Indentify macro-financial risks  Consultation (June 2009), draft 
regulation (September 2009) 
European Banking Authority  Coordinate banking regulation and 
supervision 
Consultation (June 2009), draft 
regulation (September 2009) 
European Insurance Authority  Coordinate insurance regulation and 
supervision 
Consultation (June 2009), draft 
Regulation (September 2009) 
European Securities Markets Authority  Coordinate sec. markets regulation and 
supervision 
Consultation (June 2009), draft 
Regulation (September 2009) 
 
A forceful Commissioner in charge 
A prerequisite to a credible European agenda is a 
forceful and credible Commissioner in charge. The 
outgoing Commissioner for the single market had by 
the end of his term lost all credibility. Charlie 
McCreevy’s initial slogan was “regulatory pause” 
after his predecessor Frits Bolkestein had pushed 
through the heavy Financial Services Action Plan. The 
Commissioner gave priority to market-driven 
solutions, including self-regulation, before going for 
new regulation. Even in the first months of the crisis, 
McCreevy hesitated to call for new regulation, for, for 
example, credit rating agencies or deposit guarantee 
schemes. He also did not dare to oppose the dominant 
attitude in the EU Council of Finance Ministers that 
the crisis did not signal the need to introduce changes 
to the institutional structure of supervision. It was 
only by May 2008 that the Commissioner started to 
change his position and called for a regulatory 
response. Moreover, the initiative to establish the de 
Larosière Group in October 2008 was taken by the 
Commission President, not by Commissioner 
McCreevy. 
In a related vein, consideration should be given to a 
possible re-distribution of the internal market 
portfolio. As one of the cornerstones of the EU, the 
internal market could command the full attention of 
two or three commissioners. Financial services 
matters alone deserves a single commissioner, 
especially for the next five years, when the   
Commissioner will have to push a heavy agenda 
through the EU Council and European Parliament, and 
take on additional responsibilities in the ESRB and 
ESAs. A forceful Commissioner will thus be 
extremely important for the Commission to regain the 
initiative in this policy domain. 
Conclusion 
The European Commission faces a difficult and 
precise balancing act in drafting the proposals for a 
new framework for EU supervision “by early autumn 
2009 at the latest”. It will need to come forward with 
draft legislation laying down as clearly as possible the 
objectives, functions, organisation, governance and 
funding of the new entities proposed by the de 
Larosière report, while at the same time garnering the 
support of a ‘qualified’ majority of member states. 
Since the Commission will most likely follow the Art. 
95 route, its proposals will go as far as possible within 
the limits of the EU Treaty. But the proposals will for 
the first time mark a structural change in the 
framework for financial supervision in the EU, The road ahead after de Larosière | 7 
creating three new entities with separate legal 
personality, and a huge workload.  
The measures to be decided upon in the follow-up to 
the de Larosière report come on top of the 
consultations and proposals for new measures that the 
European Commission is involved in as a result of G-
20 commitments and the further completion of the 
single market. All these will have to be pushed 
through in a context of a new European Parliament 
and a new European Commission, which does not 
augur for a swift decision process. 
But will this be enough to restore the single market? 
The financial crisis and the large state aid packages 
have forced ailing banks to re-focus on their home 
market and reduce their activities abroad. Market 
integration is declining and competition diminishing. 
It will take time before the effects of the measures 
discussed above become visible and the single market 
process advances again. 
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comprising	research	institutes	from	throughout	
Europe	and	beyond,	to	complement	and	
consolidate	CEPS	research	expertise	and	to	greatly	
extend	its	outreach.
•	 An	extensive	membership	base	of	some	120	
Corporate	Members	and	130	Institutional	
Members,	which	provide	expertise	and	practical	
experience	and	act	as	a	sounding	board	for	the	
utility	and	feasability	of	CEPS	policy	proposals.
Programme Structure
CEPS	carries	out	its	research	via	its	own	in-house	
research	programmes	and	through	collaborative	
research	networks	involving	the	active	participation	of	
other	highly	reputable	institutes	and	specialists.
Research	Programmes
Economic	&	Social	Welfare	Policies
Energy,	Climate	Change	&	Sustainable	Development
EU	Neighbourhood,	Foreign	&	Security	Policy
Financial	Markets	&	Taxation
Justice	&	Home	Affairs
Politics	&	European	Institutions
Regulatory	Affairs
Trade,	Development	&	Agricultural	Policy
Research	Networks/Joint	Initiatives
Changing	Landscape	of	Security	&	Liberty	(CHALLENGE)
European	Capital	Markets	Institute	(ECMI)
European	Climate	Platform	(ECP)
European	Credit	Research	Institute	(ECRI)
European	Network	of	Agricultural	&	Rural	Policy	Research	
Institutes	(ENARPRI)
European	Network	for	Better	Regulation	(ENBR)
European	Network	of	Economic	Policy	Research	Institutes	
(ENEPRI)
European	Policy	Institutes	Network	(EPIN)
European	Security	Forum	(ESF)
CEPS	also	organises	a	variety	of	activities	and	special	
events,	involving	its	members	and	other	stakeholders	
in	the	European	policy	debate,	national	and	EU-level	
policy-makers,	academics,	corporate	executives,	NGOs	
and	the	media.	CEPS’	funding	is	obtained	from	a	
variety	of	sources,	including	membership	fees,	project	
research,	foundation	grants,	conferences	fees,	publi-
cation	sales	and	an	annual	grant	from	the	European	
Commission.